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In both everyday discourse and the relevant psychological literature, one often finds references to 
an infant’s love for her primary caregiver. Yet most philosophical accounts of love would 
preclude the possibility of genuine infant love. Such accounts characterize love as a sophisticated 
attitude, requiring mental capacities that are beyond the infant’s ken. While I agree that infants 
are incapable of love, I will argue that the infant-primary caregiver bond can nonetheless inform 
philosophical accounts of love. By examining our earliest attachments, we can better understand 
how romantic love often improves us and contributes to our agential identities. Also, our earliest 
attachments provide insight into both how we acquire the capacity to love in youth and continue 
to develop it via later attachments in adulthood.    
 In sections 1 and 2, I explore several important similarities and differences between 
infant attachment and romantic love. In sections 3 and 4, I employ an expanded conception of 
security and literature on pathologies of attachment to show how infant attachment can play an 
instructive role in elucidating love.  
 
1 Attachment in Infancy and Adult Romantic Partnerships 
Twentieth century American poet, Margaret Fishback, opens “Love Affair” with the following 
verse: “Someday he’ll think me rather silly/But now he loves me willy-nilly” (1945). Fishback 
refers here, not to romantic love, but to an infant’s love for his mother. Such locutions are not 
unfamiliar in everyday discourse. We often find it remarkable just how much infants seem to 
unconditionally adore or love their primary caregivers in the manner that Fishback’s poem 
suggests. Psychological literature on the infant-primary caregiver bond lends support to such 
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conceptions of infant love. Sigmund Freud, for example, claimed that the mother serves as the 
infant’s “first and strongest love-object and as the prototype of all later love relations” (1946, 
70). Harry Harlow posited that the “initial love responses of the human being are those made by 
the infant to the mother…” (1958, 673). Finally, according to John Bowlby, “for babies to love 
mothers…is taken for granted as intrinsic to human nature” (1969, 242).  Bowlby’s research, in 
particular, played a vital role in establishing a connection between infant-primary caregiver 
attachments and love relationships in adulthood.  
 Bowlby and his colleague, Mary Ainsworth, pioneered the development of “attachment 
theory.”1 According to attachment theory, between six and twenty-four months of age, infants 
develop a special attachment to their primary caregivers. The attachment consists in an 
interrelated pattern of behaviors that serve to provide the infant with a sense of security. The 
relevant behaviors include: proximity maintenance, secure base, safe haven, and separation 
protest (Bowlby 1969/1982). The infant will attempt to remain in close proximity to her primary 
caregiver, treat her as a secure base from which to explore unfamiliar surroundings, use her as a 
safe haven for protection when threatened or hurt, and protest separation from her via various 
distress responses (e.g., crying). 
 Bowlby posited that the infant-primary caregiver attachment plays important roles in 
facilitating the infant’s healthy psychological development and influencing her future 
relationships. He suggested that the primary caregiver serves to regulate the infant’s affective 
states and that infants learn to become adept at regulating their own affects in the context of 
attachment relationships (Bowlby 1969/1982; Schore 1994/2016). On his view, through 
interactions with her principal attachment figure, the infant develops internal working models of 
1 For more on the development of attachment theory, see Ainsworth et al (1978) and Bowlby (1969/1982, 1973, & 
1980). 
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the self and others. Secure attachments facilitate working models of the self as worthy of care 
and self-reliant and working models of the attachment figure as accessible, caring, and 
responsive (Bowlby 1973; Ainsworth et al 1978; Mikulincer and Shaver 2016). These models are 
thought to shape the development of the child’s self-conception and various modes of viewing 
and interacting with others. Infant attachment security has been “linked with later self-esteem, 
social competence, prosocial behavior, ego resiliency, and overall adjustment” (Sroufe et al 
2000, 82). Insecure attachments often lead to working models that contribute to psychopathology 
and dysfunctional attachment patterns later in life (Mikulincer and Shaver 2016, ch. 13).  
 While Bowlby and Ainsworth focused on infant attachment, they suggested that 
attachments occur in adulthood as well, particularly in the case of romantic pair bonds. In the late 
1980’s, the field of adult attachment emerged, and since then, a great deal of research has been 
devoted to investigating attachment bonds between romantic partners (Hazan and Shaver 1987).2 
 Adult attachment theorists have recognized strong similarities between infant-primary 
caregiver engagement and romantic adult interaction. In communicating with one another, 
romantic partners often “coo, sing, talk baby talk” and “use soft maternal tones” (Shaver et al 
1988, 75). Mikulincer and Shaver note, “Love in both infancy and adulthood includes eye 
contact, holding, touching, caressing, smiling, crying, clinging…” (2016, p. 18).  Romantic 
partners also often display the interrelated pattern of attachment behaviors that typify infant-
primary caregiver relationships. Familiarly, adults seek proximity to their romantic partners and 
protest extended separation from them. According to adult attachment theorists, our romantic 
partners also serve as secure bases and safe havens for us. When our romantic partners are 
nearby, we experience greater confidence (and competence) in navigating new environments and 
2 For more on adult attachment, see Shaver et al 1988; Rholes and Simpson 2004; Hazan, Campa, and Gur-Yaish, 
2006, Mikulincer and Goodman 2006, Feeney 2008, and Mikulincer and Shaver 2016. 
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taking on challenges. And when distressed or threatened, we tend to turn specifically to our 
romantic partners for comfort and support (Collins et al 2006; Mikulincer and Shaver 2016).  
 Attachment-primary caregiver bonds and romantic partnerships share other 
commonalities as well. Interactions with our romantic partners often help regulate our emotions 
and continue to shape our internal working models of the self in relation to others. Studies 
suggest that the mere presence of one’s romantic partner can increase positive affect and assuage 
distress, as indicated by the attached party’s reduced blood pressure, heart rate, and galvanic skin 
responses in stressful situations (Mikulincer and Shaver 2016, 58-59). Our adult attachment 
figures offer external support via soothing contact, empathy, and other comforting behaviors, and 
they also enhance our abilities to self-soothe (Mikulincer and Shaver 2016; Sroufe et al 2000). 
Healthy interactions with adult attachment figures impact our abilities to self-soothe, in part, by 
facilitating positive internal working models that represent the self as worthy, competent, and 
lovable and others as caring and dependable. Activating mental representations of supportive 
romantic attachments can also help one cope with threats (Mikulincer and Shaver 2014, 12, 36).  
 In sum, the parallels between the infant-primary caregiver bond and long-term romantic 
attachments are striking, and it is perhaps unsurprising that many have identified both relations 
as “love.” Both involve similar patterns of communication, behavior, and attitudes toward one’s 
attachment figure, where positive interactions with the relevant person help to regulate our 
emotions, shape our conceptions of ourselves and others, and imbue us with an overall increased 
sense of security. Despite these parallels, however, philosophical accounts of love generally 
suggest against construing infant attachments as genuine love – a topic to which I now turn.  
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2 Attachment and Love: Important Differences 
While there exist many similarities between infant attachment and romantic love, there are also 
many significant differences. A chief difference is that romantic love – and indeed, love of all 
kinds – is commonly thought to involve caring about or valuing one’s beloved in a way that is 
not possible for infants.3 Also, while romantic partnerships share some common features with 
infant-primary caregiver attachments, those features are not obviously central to love.   
 Let’s begin with a few obvious differences between the attachment orientations of infants 
toward their primary caregivers and those of adults toward their romantic partners. First, while 
we seek proximity to our romantic partners and protest extended separation from them, mature 
adults are typically more tolerant of longer separations and less likely to demand attention by 
crying, throwing tantrums, etc. Also, unlike the infant’s interaction with her primary caregiver, 
attachment behaviors in adult romantic partnerships are reciprocated. In other words, each 
partner is typically both attached to the other and serves as an attachment figure for the other.  
 Psychologists acknowledge that romantic love, in addition to attachment, also involves 
sex and caregiving (Mikulincer 2006). Philosophers of love have attended to both of these 
features in their accounts. Union views of love, on which love involves a merger of selves or 
identities (or at least a desire for merger) are well-equipped to capture the sexual element that 
typifies romantic love (Nozick 1989; Solomon 2001). And while philosophers tend to emphasize 
the attitudes that underlie caregiving behaviors towards one beloved, as opposed to the behaviors 
themselves, they generally attribute caring or valuing a central role in love. 
 Philosophers generally agree that love involves valuing and/or caring about one’s 
beloved for the beloved’s own sake. For example, Harry Frankfurt characterizes love as a “mode 
3 While I suspect that attachment can inform other varieties of love as well, for the sake of simplicity, I focus here 
on romantic love. 
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of caring” that is marked by, among other things, disinterested concern for one’s beloved (1999a; 
2004). J. David Velleman suggests that love is a kind of “awe” that emerges upon the recognition 
of a value inhering in the object (1999, 360-361). Richard White claims that love “involves a 
very deep appreciation for the absolute value of the other person” (2001, p. 5). According to 
Niko Kolodny, love consists in non-instrumentally valuing one’s relationship with the beloved 
(and the beloved herself) (2003, 150). On Bennett Helm’s view, love is a particular kind of 
caring that involves an identificatory commitment to the object in which the lover shares the 
beloved’s values for her sake (2009a, 52; 2009b, ch. 5). These theorists represent only a sample 
of those who posit that to love is, among other things, to care about or value the beloved object.4   
 Some theorists regard caring and valuing as the same phenomenon.5 On most accounts, 
caring involves certain desires to promote the cared-for object’s flourishing and an emotional 
vulnerability to how that object is faring (Shoemaker 2003; Jaworska 2007a/b; Seidman 2008). If 
an agent cares about an object, she typically wants that object to flourish. She will also, for 
example, tend to feel joy when it is thriving, sadness when it is faltering, fear when it is in danger 
and so forth. These features, along with others, have also been identified as central elements of 
valuing.6 Theorists typically posit that caring requires cognitive capacities that infants lack. 
Examples include the capacities to grasp the concept of importance, to form higher-order desires 
and to see others as reasons for action and emotion.7   
4 See also Brown 1987, 24; Badhwar 2003, 56; Jollimore 2013, 26; and Brentlinger 1989, 139.   
5 See for example Seidman 2009.  
6 Jaworska (1999) emphasizes that valuing involves the valuer thinking herself “correct in wanting what she wants” 
(p. 155). Bratman (2000) describes valuing as a special type of self-governing policy.  Finally, theorists such as 
Scanlon (1998), Kolodny (2003), Seidman (2009) and Scheffler (2011) emphasize the relationship between valuing 
and reasons for action and/or emotion. 
7 Frankfurt makes volition rather than emotion central to his view of caring, affording higher-order desires a crucial 
role in the attitude. In particular, he describes caring about an object in terms of having and identifying with’’ a 
higher-order desire that her first-order desire for the object ‘‘not be extinguished or abandoned’’ (Frankfurt 1999a, 
161). Jaworska posits that one must have ‘‘the concept of importance’’ in order to care (2007b, p. 561). Seidman 
suggests that one must be able to see the object of care as a source of reasons (2008, 12). On Helm’s view, the 
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 The preceding discussion suggests that while infants may be attached to their primary 
caregivers, they cannot care about, or value, them in the sense that love requires. Love, it is 
commonly supposed, is a complex orientation toward its object that requires cognitively rich 
ways of seeing, understanding, and engaging with its object. Infant attachment, then, appears to 
be missing key ingredients for genuine love.  
 Not only is the infant incapable of love, but it is not immediately clear how attachment in 
adults contributes to love. One might concede that most adults are attached to their long-term 
romantic partners, while denying that attachment plays an integral role in romantic love. 
Consider, for example, Frankfurt’s claim that “… lovers often enjoy the company of their 
beloveds, cherish various types of intimate connection with them, and yearn for reciprocity. 
These enthusiasms are not essential to it” (2004, p. 42). Similarly, there may be reason to suspect 
that attachment, while perhaps a natural concomitant of romantic love, is in no way central to it.  
 One might deny attachment a central role in love because the felt need internal to it is 
undergirded by the attachment figure’s impact on the attached person’s sense of security. Such a 
feature might strike some as ill-suited to contribute to love in any significant sense. First, the 
relevant need seems to be focused on the lover’s own comfort and safety, while love is typically 
thought to be other-regarding, and on some accounts, selfless.8 Second, it may be difficult to see 
how needing another for comfort and safety is a good thing, let alone one that makes a positive 
contribution to love. Well-functioning, mature, and autonomous agents, one might think, should 
not have security-based needs for their beloveds, and where they do, such orientations are not 
particular sort of caring involved in love necessitates the capacity to experience certain cognitively sophisticated, 
“person-focused” emotions such as pride and guilt (2009b, 227).  
8  See, for example, Frankfurt 1999 and 1999b. See also Helm’s discussion of robust concern views of love (2009b, 
16-18). 
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obviously related to love. Love, after all, is distinctive for its rich value and depth, and the 
primitive need for safety seems peripheral to these essential features.  
 In sum, while infant-primary caregiver bonds and romantic loving relationships tend to 
feature somewhat similar attachment orientations, the relevant attachments do not suffice for 
love. Infants lack the cognitive capacities to care about or value others in the way that love 
requires, so their attachments cannot constitute love. Furthermore, for all that has been said so 
far, while romantic partners who love each other are typically also attached to one another, the 
latter relation may well be orthogonal to the couple’s love. Thus, we are left with the question: 
Can the infant-primary caregiver attachment tell us anything interesting about love? In the 
remaining two sections, I offer an affirmative answer to this question.   
 
3 Security and Agency: A Role for Attachment in Love  
While infants do not (strictly speaking) love others, their attachment relations in which they 
stand to their primary caregivers can inform philosophical conceptions of love. Contra the view 
discussed in the previous section, here I will argue that the type of felt need internal to 
attachment partly constitutes and enhances some kinds of love. Examining the relevant need can 
inform extant views of how love impacts our identities and contributes value to our lives.  
 Let’s begin by revisiting the type of need internal to attachment. In the preceding section, 
I suggested that security’s role in undergirding attachment relationships might engender doubt 
that attachment could be an important aspect of love. I will now endeavor to assuage such doubts 
by articulating an expanded conception of security that can illuminate defining features of love, 
revealing how a security-based need can contribute to love’s value.  
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 While Bowlby and Ainsworth sometimes associate “security” with “feeling safe,” they 
also sometimes gesture at a richer notion of the concept. For example, Ainsworth, drawing on 
Bowlby’s work, offers a conception of security as ‘‘an ‘all is well’ kind of appraisal of sensory 
input,’’ or ‘‘an ‘Okay, go ahead’ feeling’’ (1988, 1). In other work, I have described the type of 
security at issue in attachment as a kind of confidence in one’s well-being and agential 
competence. In colloquial terms, without our attachment objects, we tend to feel off-kilter, out of 
sorts, no longer “all of a piece” and so forth. Conversely, engaging with our attachment objects 
helps us to feel empowered, better equipped to take on challenges, etc. (Wonderly 2016, 231).9  
 Our attachment figures don’t merely help us feel safe, but they can help hold us together 
during difficult times and improve us more generally. Experiencing another as a felt need in this 
sense suggests that the other plays a very meaningful role in how one views oneself and is able to 
get along in the world. To be sure, needing another in this way seems to focus on one’s own 
welfare as opposed to that of the beloved, and it does not suffice for love. One must care about, 
or value, the other in her own right in order to truly love her. But in some cases, the type of need 
internal to attachment might – like concern for the other’s welfare – play an important, and 
indeed constitutive, role in love.10  
 To see this, imagine that an individual has the opportunity to do something that will be to 
her overall benefit but will necessitate being separated from, and unreachable by, her (long-term) 
romantic partner for many years. Imagine further that upon receiving the news, her partner –  
9 For other views that support this notion of felt security, consider the following: Abraham Maslow characterized 
security as a ‘‘syndrome of feelings,’’ that includes, inter alia, feelings of ‘‘being at home in the world,’’ 
‘‘emotional stability,’’ ‘‘self-esteem,’’ ‘‘self-acceptance,’’ and ‘‘courage’’ (1942, 334–335). William Blatz, in 
developing his ‘‘security theory,’’ identified security as ‘‘the state of mind which accompanies the willingness to 
accept the consequences of one’s acts…’’ (1966, 13). According to Ainsworth, Blatz, who had been her dissertation 
advisor, ‘‘seemed to equate feeling secure with feeling competent or effective’’ (1988, 1). 
10 Note that I am not arguing for the stronger claim that attachment is essential for love tout court. 
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being selflessly invested in her welfare – responds only with joy, celebrating her good fortune 
and excitedly offering to help her pack. The departing partner might well be disappointed at such 
a response, preferring that her beloved not only be motivated by the desire for her flourishing but 
also by a deeply felt need for her.11  I suspect that this is not merely an unimportant preference, 
but that some kinds of love would be impoverished absent some felt need of this kind.  
 Of course, one might accept that a felt need of another can be partly constitutive of love, 
while objecting to the relevant need being tied to the lover’s security. Experiencing another as a 
security-based felt need might strike some as puerile or selfish. Doubtless, few have ever been 
smitten by a lover who imparted, “Baby, you make me feel so secure.” Imagine, though, that the 
lover instead imparts: “Without you, my life would be less meaningful – less fulfilled. I would 
not be able to get by as I normally can, but I would feel adrift and no longer all of a piece.” 
These sentiments capture the sense of security at issue here, and rather than being childish or 
unduly self-centered, they seem to reflect a way of relating to another that can be a worthy – and 
deeply important – aspect of one’s love.  
 The expanded notion of security that I describe above can also help to illuminate the 
relationship between attachment and love’s contributions to one’s agency and identity. 
Philosophical treatments of love often emphasize various ways in which love improves our lives. 
Love (typically) is a source of joy and imbues life with meaning and purpose (Frankfurt 1999b; 
Badhwar 2003; White 2001). But attachment affords us an under-explored, yet instructive 
framework, for understanding how love can improve us.  
 Frequent engagement with an attachment figure tends to increase confidence in one’s 
well-being and one’s ability to competently navigate the world. In infancy, this feature manifests 
11 I discuss such a case at greater length in “Love and Attachment” (forthcoming).   
                                                          
Wonderly   11 
 
in the infant’s ability to venture increasingly farther away from her primary caregiver without 
worry and to interact more comfortably with new environments. In adulthood, positive 
interactions with our attachment figures often imbue us with a confidence that serves to inspire 
us, to raise the bar for complacency, and to attenuate our tendencies toward risk aversion 
(Feeney 2004; Collins et al 2006; Mikulincer & Shaver 2016). Consequently, our attachments 
can increase our capabilities and help us to achieve in ways that we would be otherwise unable to 
do. They not only lift us when we are low, but in providing a secure and supportive ground, they 
can enable us to soar.  
 We often recognize such qualities in love. Consider, for example, how love’s benefits are 
often portrayed in popular music. “My love, whenever I was insecure, you built me up and made 
me sure.”12  “You gave me wings, you made me fly.” 13  “…my loving arms around you, I can 
stand up and face the world. Your love keeps lifting me higher and higher.”14 These lyrics 
support a picture of love on which one’s romantic partner is not only a source of joy and 
purpose, but also a source of empowerment. Where attachment exists in loving relationships, it 
may provide an important vehicle through which love can enhance our agency in these ways.  
 Relatedly, attending to attachment can also aid our understanding of how love can impact 
one’s identity. On many accounts, love is marked by a kind of depth that is thought to tie the 
attitude to the agent’s identity. How and what (or whom) we love seems to be intimately 
connected to who we are. Theorists have framed this relation in terms of integrating the beloved 
into one’s identity, identifying one’s own interests with those of one’s beloved, or a kind of 
12 These lyrics are from “You Make Me Feel Brand New,” by the Stylistics (1974). 
13 These lyrics are from Celine Dion’s 1996 single, “Because You Loved Me.” 
14 The lyrics are from Jackie Wilson’s 1967 single, “(Your Love Keeps Lifting Me) Higher and Higher." 
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volitional endorsement of one’s attitudes toward one’s beloved.15 Attachment offers us still 
another lens through which to view love’s impact on one’s identity.  
 Our interactions with our attachment figures can play an important role in shaping one’s 
agential identity.16 Recall from section 1, that in both infancy and adulthood, interactions with 
our attachment figures continue to influence our “internal working models” of the self. They play 
crucial roles in how we understand ourselves and our abilities to act competently within the 
world. Since our specific attachment figures are uniquely positioned to impact our felt security in 
the ways that they do, they can have especially powerful effects on our self-conceptions, how we 
relate to others, and how we function more generally as agents.  
 Of course, infant attachment, which serves as the context for the attached individual’s 
development into a full-fledged agent, seems to be the best illustration of how attachment bonds 
can help to shape one’s agential identity. Via engagement with her attachment figure, the infant 
learns to navigate the realm of affects and cognitions that will enable the formation of identity-
constituting values and perspectives. The infant’s understanding of herself and others grows out 
of the internal working models that she develops through such interactions, serving as the ground 
for how she will tend to view and to function within future relationships. In this way, though 
infant attachment is not synonymous with love, it does shape the infant’s future capacity to love. 
This point is worth exploring in greater detail, as it can tell us something interesting about how 
attachment, in both infancy and adulthood, can help us learn to love well.   
 
 
15 Nozick (1989), Frankfurt (1999a; 1999b; 2004), Solomon (2001), White (2001), and Helm (2010) are among the 
many theorists who have posited a relationship between identity and love.  
16 By “agential identity,” I do not mean to imply anything particularly mysterious here. I take it that how a person 
views herself and experiences her agency constitutes an important aspect of her identity as the agent she is.  
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4 Attachment and the Capacity to Love 
Research suggests that early attachment experiences tend to exert considerable influence over 
how one loves in adulthood. Much of this research concerns certain “pathologies of 
attachment.”17 Bowlby, for example, suggested a causal relationship between early attachment 
disruption and “affectionless psychopathy” in later years (Bowlby 1944; 1973). More recent 
research has indicated that severe disruption in early attachment can, but does not always, 
contribute to the development of psychopathic characteristics, depression, social phobias, 
obsessive compulsive disorder, addiction, anxiety disorders and a host of personality disorders 
(Karen 1998; Flores 2004; Mikulincer and Shaver 2016).18 Yet, what is most relevant for the 
present discussion is not merely that early attachment disruption has been associated with later 
psychological disorder, but rather how such disruption is thought to hinder various capacities 
necessary for valuing.  
17 The term, “pathologies of attachment,” can refer either to mental disorders for which attachment difficulties are 
presumed to play a significant causal role and/or psychologically disordered forms of attachment formation or 
maintenance. Most work on attachment psychopathology focuses on the former. Note that the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders does not list attachment disorders as its own category. Reactive attachment 
disorder, the central feature of which is “absent or grossly underdeveloped attachment between the child and 
putative caregiving adults,” is characterized as a “Trauma/Stressor Disorder” (APA 2013, 266). There are, however, 
several disorders that explicitly include attachment difficulties, including (but not limited to): Separation Anxiety 
Disorder, Disinhibited Social Engagement Disorder, and Autism Spectrum Disorder. 
18 Psychologists have also linked disruption or dysfunction in early attachment relationships to “insecure attachment 
styles” that tend to follow infants through their later years and contribute to mental disorder. The system by which 
insecure attachment styles are classified grew largely out of Ainsworth’s empirical study of infant-primary caregiver 
interaction (1978). Ainsworth identified two patterns of insecure infant attachment: avoidant and anxious. In infants, 
these patterns track certain atypical infant responses to separation and reunion with their primary caregivers. 
Securely attached infants tend to show some distress upon separation from their primary caregivers, but recover 
quickly upon reunion, exhibiting joy and a desire to return to exploration and play. Avoidant infants tend to show 
little distress upon separation from their primary caregivers and to avoid them when they return. Anxious infants are 
highly distressed during separation from their primary givers and display conflicting behaviors upon the caregiver’s 
return – e.g., alternating patterns of clinging and pulling away (Mikulincer and Shaver 2016, 23-24).  In adulthood, 
an avoidant attachment style indicates “discomfort with closeness and dependence” and a strong “preference for 
emotional distance and self-reliance” (Mikulincer and Shaver 2016, 25). An anxious attachment style indicates a 
very strong desire for closeness and intense worries about being abandoned or under-valued by one’s partner (ibid.). 
Though insecure attachment styles themselves are not psychological disorders, they are sometimes labeled 
“pathogenic,” as they can, when combined by other risk factors, lead to psychopathology (Mikulincer and Shaver 
2012; Karen 1998; Sroufe et al 2000). For more on attachment styles, see Berit Brogaard’s entry in this volume.  
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 Recall that (as I have argued) while attachment plays an important role in some kinds of 
love, it does not suffice for love. This is because one can be attached without valuing, or caring 
about, one’s attachment object in the way that love requires. Importantly, though, attachment is 
not silent on the matter of valuing. Attachment relationships (typically) serve to develop and 
hone one’s ability to value, thereby helping to shape one’s capacity to love. Research on 
attachment and psychopathology offers a useful lens through which to view this phenomenon. 
 Neuroscientists have suggested that early disruption or dysfunction in attachment can 
interfere with the development of brain structures that facilitate empathy, socio-emotional 
learning, and affect regulation. Theorists have proposed that the proper development and 
function of such structures is “experience-dependent,” and in particular, dependent upon healthy 
attachment interactions between the infant and her primary caregiver (Schore 1994/2016). Early 
attachment difficulties can leave the infant with impaired abilities to adequately attend to her 
own emotions and to the emotions and interests of others, rendering her vulnerable to mental 
disorder and future relationship dysfunction (Schore 1994/2016; Sroufe et al 2000).  
  To see more clearly how attachment can impact one’s capacity to love, it will be useful 
to briefly explore two particular attachment-related forms of psychopathology: psychopathy and 
addiction. Not only have early attachment problems been suggested as causal contributors to 
psychopathic personalities and addiction, but these pathologies are also marked by occurrent 
attachment difficulties.19 Psychopaths have impaired capacities for forming attachments to other 
persons (Cleckley 1998; Hare 1993; Blair et al 2005). And some addictions can be viewed as, 
19 To be sure, not all cases of psychopathic personalities and addiction can be traced to earlier attachment problems. 
It is also worth noting that some reserve the term “psychopathy” for a pre-existing brain disorder, and use 
“sociopathy” where similar traits arise as a result of environmental factors (see, for example Hare 1993, 23-24). The 
DSM-V has no entry dedicated to psychopathy, but references it, along with sociopathy, in the entry on antisocial 
personality disorder (2013, 659).  
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among other things, disordered attachment orientations toward their objects (Flores 2004). More 
importantly for our purposes, both psychopaths and addicted agents appear to have difficulties 
caring about, or valuing, others in the way that loving – or at least loving well – requires. 
 Let’s start with psychopaths. Psychopathy is a personality disorder that involves a 
tendency toward antisocial behaviors (e.g., threatening behavior such as verbal abuse or 
violence, repeated criminal conduct) and certain emotional-interpersonal deficits (e.g., shallow 
affect, lack of empathy, inability to feel guilt).20 Typically, philosophers have been interested in 
the psychopath’s moral deficits, which some have argued, might exempt her from moral 
responsibility.21 Psychopaths seem to lack the abilities to become emotionally invested in others 
and to recognize their interests as intrinsically reason-giving (Jaworska 2007; Watson 2011). 
These capacities, of course, are relevant not only to moral agency, but also to love. 
 Recall that love, as a mode of valuing or caring, involves an emotional vulnerability to 
how one’s beloved is faring and certain desires to promote the beloved’s flourishing.22 The 
psychological literature on attachment has the resources to explain how early attachment 
difficulties can contribute to psychopathic personality traits. The child first learns how to 
recognize and engage with the interests of others through attachment with her primary caregiver. 
If the infant’s attachment figure is unresponsive or abusive, the infant may grow to feel 
uncomfortable with her vulnerability and reliance on others. Consequently, she may resist 
allowing herself to be vulnerable enough to care about others in the future.23 In addition, her 
20 See for example Cleckley 1998, 338-339; Hare 1993, 34; and Blair et al. 2005, 7. 
21 See for example Darwall 2006; Shoemaker 2007; and Watson 2011.  
22 For a discussion of how love differs from mere caring, see Jaworska and Wonderly forthcoming.  
23 For more on how one’s experience of, and attitude toward, one’s own vulnerability can impact one’s abilities to 
engage in caring and prosocial behaviors, see Miller 2012 and Gilson 2014.   
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poor internal working models of others, combined with her lack of learned facility with 
emotions, may preclude any desire for – or competence with – promoting another’s flourishing.  
 Theorists have suggested that some addictions represent “attachments” to their objects, 
albeit disordered ones.24 Philosophers have been concerned to investigate the impact of addiction 
on human agency. The addicted agent’s strongly felt need for the object tends to consume her 
attention, “crowding out” other potential interests, values, and cares, narrowing (what she sees 
as) her field of available actions (Elster 1999, 69; Watson 1999). Focused on the addiction 
object, she may lack the attentional resources to engage non-instrumentally with her beloved’s 
interests. An addicted agent, then, may lack the ability to adequately recognize and respond to 
her beloved’s concerns in a way necessary for properly valuing her and thus loving her well.  
 Attachment research can serve to illuminate this phenomenon. Disruptions or dysfunction 
in early attachment can engender painful working models of the self and others, along with 
lasting inabilities to properly self-regulate one’s affects. As a result, the agent turns to the 
addiction object for help coping with distress (Flores 2004; Mikulincer and Shaver 2016). Insofar 
as the addiction object helps to restore – however temporarily or superficially – the agent’s sense 
of security, she will feel especially compelled to partake of it. Psychologists have long held that 
felt security has a kind of priority over other motives. Unless one feels sufficiently secure, one 
will typically be unable to competently engage in other-directed activities like caregiving, 
affiliative pursuits, and sex (Mikulincer & Shaver 2016, 15). Since the addicted agent may be 
rigidly focused on her own security-based attachment needs, she may be unable to adequately 
recognize or respond to the interests of her beloved.25  
24 See for example Flores 2004, 4-10.  
25 Note that this picture is meant to supplement and deepen, rather than replace, typical “disordered neural reward 
signal” models of addiction that pervade much of the scientific and philosophical literature on addiction.  
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 Healthy early attachments, then, help shape our capacities to love in multiple ways. First, 
early attachments initiate the formation of our abilities to self-regulate our affects and to 
empathically recognize and attend to the emotional needs of others. In addition, healthy 
attachments facilitate conceptions of the self and others that conduce to comfort with one’s own 
vulnerability and positive dispositions toward the interests of others. Our early attachment 
experiences serve as our first opportunities to engage with our own vulnerability and to observe 
models of caring provided by our attachment figures. In well-functioning attachments, one can 
comfortably inhabit one’s own vulnerability because others will be there if needed. Experiencing 
one’s own vulnerability in this way, combined with one’s empathic abilities and positive 
conception of others, disposes us to recognize and respond compassionately toward 
vulnerabilities in others. Finally, by grounding a general sense of security, healthy early 
attachments afford us the emotional resources to appropriately recognize others’ value and to 
promote their interests.  
 What’s more, these qualities are present not only in infant attachment, but in adult 
attachment as well. Our deeply felt needs of our attachment figures make us keenly aware of our 
own vulnerability, underscoring their import for us and facilitating our empathic recognition of 
their vulnerability (and that of others). As our adult attachment figures continue both to aid the 
regulation of our affects and to support positive internal working models of ourselves and others, 
they equip us with greater resources and motivation to properly value and care for others. Thus, 
early attachment helps us to develop our capacities to love, and attachments later in life continue 
to enhance our abilities to love well.  
 
 




 Infant attachment, then, while not synonymous with love, can nonetheless inform 
philosophical conceptions of romantic love. In romantic love, the adult analog of infant security 
plays an important role in explaining how love can empower us to achieve in ways that we 
otherwise would be unable to do. Similarly, the beloved’s ability to impact one’s sense of 
security offers an under-explored insight into how love can affect our identities. One’s beloved 
plays an important role in one’s self-conception and her ability to competently navigate the 
world, features that are central to one’s agential identity. Finally, examining certain pathologies 
of attachment brings to the fore crucial respects in which attachment, in both infancy and 
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